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This article concerns the psychology of the paradoxical Two Envelope Problem. The goal is to
find instructive variants of the envelope switching problem that are capable of clear-cut resolution,
while still retaining paradoxical features. By relocating the original problem into different contexts
involving commutes and playing cards the reader is presented with a succession of resolved para-
doxes that reduce the confusion arising from the parent paradox. The goal is to reduce confusion by
understanding how we sometimes misread mathematical statements; or, to completely avoid confu-
sion, either by reforming language, or adopting an unambiguous notation for switching problems.
This article also suggests that an illusion close in character to the figure/ground illusion hampers
our understanding of switching problems in general and helps account for the intense confusion that
switching problems sometimes generate.
This article concerns the psychology of the paradoxical
Two Envelope Problem [1–11]. It opens with the intro-
duction of a simple related problem — The Two Com-
muters Problem in Sec. I — with the idea that a linguis-
tic analysis of this basic problem can shed light on the
psychology of the well-known Two Envelope Problem,
which will be discussed in Sec. III. The general goal is
to find variants of the envelope switching problem that
are capable of clear-cut resolution, while still retaining
paradoxical features. By relocating the original envelope
problem into different contexts involving commutes (in
Sec. I), a finite number of playing cards (in Secs. IV, V,
VIII, IX, and X), and a random walk (in Sec. VI), the
reader is presented with a succession of resolved para-
doxes that reduce the confusion arising from the parent
paradox.
The author has kept in mind that where paradoxes
are concerned it is not enough to point out the right an-
swer, one also must provide an explanation of how other
seemingly plausible answers are logically — or psycholog-
ically — flawed. For this reason a Socratic dialogue is
used in Sec. V to explore an enigmatic switching prob-
lem from multiple perspectives: first reducing paradoxical
confusion, then reviving it, then reducing it, thereby clar-
ifying some basic (but subtle) points of switching prob-
lems. The goal is to reduce confusion through an under-
standing of how we misread mathematical statements,
or to avoid confusion altogether through reform of lan-
guage. This dialogue leads to some suggestions concern-
ing the vocabulary of switching, and a compact notation
for unambiguously specifying some switching problems;
see Sec. VII.
In Sec. II it is suggested that an illusion close in charac-
ter to the figure/ground illusion [12] hampers our under-
standing of switching paradoxes in general; this reflects
this article’s emphasis on psychological issues. In sug-
gesting a role for the figure/ground illusion this article
supports Raymond Smullyan’s contention that The Two
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Envelope Problem has paradoxical features that do not
concern probability [6]; see Sec. XI.
I. THE TWO COMMUTERS PROBLEM
A. Problem Statement
Every day Alice and Bob commute separately to work,
where on alternate days Bob commutes first twice as far
as Alice, and then half as far as Alice, keeping up this
alternating pattern over the course of a leap year. The
question is, who commutes the longer yearly distance?
B. Analysis
To better understand this problem we need to restate
it mathematically. But what exactly do we know? We
appear to know that Alice always commutes X, and that
Bob commutes 2X, X/2, 2X, X/2, ... , etc. on alternate
days throughout the year. It follows that over the 366
days of a leap year Bob commutes daily (2X + X/2)/2
on average, whereas Alice commutes X on average. If
X 6= 0 then over the course of a year Bob has the longer
commute.
Is this translation of the problem into mathematics
correct? Not necessarily.
To see why, assume that on the first day Alice travels
four miles and Bob eight. What must happen on the
second day to fulfill the Problem Statement, if, say, only
one of them alters their commute? The answer is: Either
Bob must alter his commute to two miles (the obvious
answer) or Alice must alter her commute to 16. Although
the original wording appears to say that Alice has a fixed
commute, this is largely the result of a quirk of language.
In English we sometimes have an asymmetry in words
that is not reflected in the situation described:
Shoe Salesman: Madame, your left foot is smaller
than your right foot.
Shoe Salesman: Madame, your right foot is larger
than your left foot.
2(Observe that in going from the first sentence to the sec-
ond the swaps left ↔ right and smaller ↔ larger are
made.) In fact a close reading of the Problem State-
ment reveals nothing that prohibits Alice’s commute
from changing.
To amplify this point, consider the following two sen-
tences, the first of which is taken verbatim from the Prob-
lem Statement, and the second of which follows from
making the swaps Alice ↔ Bob and twice ↔ half on
the first:
 “Every day Alice and Bob commute separately to
work, where on alternate days Bob commutes first
twice as far as Alice, and then half as far as Alice,
keeping up this alternating pattern over the course
of a leap year.”
 “Every day Bob and Alice commute separately to
work, where on alternate days Alice commutes first
half as far as Bob, and then twice as far as Bob,
keeping up this alternating pattern over the course
of a leap year.”
However different these statements may at first appear,
a case can be made that they are logically equivalent. To
the author they both convey the same literal meaning,
either
Bob’s commute
Alice’s commute
= 2(−1)
N−1
(1.1)
or, equivalently,
Bob’s commute
Alice’s commute
= (day # is odd) ? 2 :
1
2
,
(1.2)
where N equals the day number 1 to 366. In the same
way, the two renditions of the shoe salesman’s excuse for
ill-fitting shoes convey the same literal meaning, however
they may differ subjectively.
One final point: Suppose we learn that on the first day
Bob’s commute
Alice’s commute
=
4.628 miles
2.314 miles
. (1.3)
What exactly have we added to our knowledge? Abso-
lutely nothing. The above equation merely states that on
the first day Bob travels twice as far as Alice, not that
Bob travels 4.628 miles.
C. Reanalysis
So what do we actually know about Alice’s and Bob’s
commutes from the Problem Statement? Very little! It
might be that on the first day Alice travels one mile and
Bob two miles, and then they swap these commutes day
by day. Perhaps Bob travels four miles every day, and
Alice travels two and eight miles on alternate days. Per-
haps Alice and Bob travel one and two miles the first day,
respectively; four and two the second day, respectively;
four and eight the third day, respectively; and so on. Per-
haps their commutes are planned as in these examples,
but are altered by a common multiplier that depends on
how much it rains.
What is peculiar is that the original Problem State-
ment seems so definite and constraining while actually
saying so little. A cabdriver charging by the mile and
trying to maximize his income by transporting just one
of them back and forth from work cannot tell from the
original description who best to contract his yearly ser-
vices to. This is because all of the above algorithms yield
commutes consistent with the Problem Statement. But it
is the exact algorithm used to generate these commutes
that the cabdriver needs to know to determine whose
yearly commute is longer — not merely the feature that
“Bob commutes first twice as far as Alice, and then half
as far as Alice, keeping up this alternating pattern over
the course of a leap year,” which fails to tell him the
very thing he needs to know: who has the longer yearly
commute.
D. Feature Versus Algorithm
In this light reconsider this earlier inference:
“We appear to know that Alice always commutes
X, and that Bob commutes 2X, X/2, 2X, X/2,
... , etc. on alternate days throughout the year.”
This statement appears to be wrong because Alice’s com-
mute need not be fixed. But underlying this is a subtle
question. What exactly is meant by a statement such as:
Today Alice commutes X and Bob 2X or X/2?
If the reader thinks it concerns mere feature (i.e. an as-
pect of what we observe) then it could be thought to
mean the same as
Alice’s commute
Bob’s commute
= 2±1 . (1.4)
But if the reader thinks it concerns algorithm (i.e. orig-
ination) then he is justified in imagining someone first
choosing Alice’s commute X, and then flipping a coin to
determine whether Bob commute is 2X or X/2. Judging
the meaning of the above sentence engages taste, bias,
preference, and expectation, which is why such ambigu-
ity should be avoided whenever possible.
II. THE FIGURE/GROUND ILLUSION
Why do people sometimes badly misjudge The Two
Commuters Problem Statement? The author suspects it
has something to do with the figure/ground illusion, also
known as figure/ground reversal [12].
Firstly, note that figure/ground organization involves
seeing at least one solid-looking and well-defined object
3(the figure) standing out against a fuzzy and formless
background (the ground). Secondly, note that in the fig-
ure/ground illusion a person sees an image having details
that alternately appear as figure and ground. Perhaps
the most famous such illusion involves a vase and two
faces:
When the vase appears as figure, the faces are unseen as
part of the ground. And when the faces appear as figure,
it is the vase that is unseen as part of the ground. For this
illusion there is a tendency to perceive either the vase, or
the faces, but not both simultaneously. Essentially, the
two interpretations compete for attention with only one
winning at any given time.
For The Two Commuters Problem we are inclined to
see Alice as having a fixed commute (which is to say, as
being the figure), and Bob as having a fuzzy commute
(which is to say, as being the ground). And just as a
“hidden” figure may sometimes have to be pointed out
to us in some illusions, such as:
so the hidden possibility of Bob having a fixed commute
may have to be pointed out to us. And, lastly, although
the prototypical figure/ground illusion concerns visual
stimuli, the author can see nothing that prevents it from
also applying to The Two Commuters Problem in par-
ticular, or switching problems generally.
III. THE TWO ENVELOPE PROBLEM
The above commuting problem and figure/ground il-
lusion will now be used to try to shed light on the much
discussed Two Envelope Problem [1–11], which is the fo-
cus of this section.
A. Problem Statement
A Player is shown two envelopes, one of which is
known to contain twice as much money as the other. The
Player is invited to choose one envelope, open it, and then
decide whether to switch envelopes.
B. Analysis
Employing the above figure/ground analogy we see
that once The Player takes one envelope and it occludes
the other envelope (presumably lying on a table) the
taken envelope becomes the figure. The Player then au-
tomatically sees the occluded envelope as ground, and as
having a variable or fuzzy amount. (That is to say, he
thinks the occluded envelope contains an algorithmically-
determined amount that is either 2X or X/2, whereas
he holds X.) Hence, he wrongly concludes that it must
make sense to switch, as he has more to gain 2X − X
than lose X − X/2. This belief — that switching must
make great sense — can be very strong, just as the fig-
ure/ground illusion can be very strong, and this mindset
is only reinforced after he actually opens the envelope he
holds and identifies X. Of course, we know from The
Two Commuters Problem that the above reasoning is
false: The player knowing that an amount is either twice
or half as large as another in no way guarantees that it
was not fixed.
C. A Psychologically Different Version of The Two
Envelope Problem
It is illuminating to imagine a psychologically differ-
ent version of The Two Envelope Problem, in which The
Player grabs the envelope he does not want, so that the
envelope he has chosen becomes part of the occluded
ground. It is the author’s expectation that The Player
will then think of this occluded envelope as having a vari-
able amount, despite its being the chosen envelope. In
these reversed circumstances The Player may well be dis-
inclined to switch away from his first choice.
IV. THE DAISY CHAINED CARDS PROBLEM
We will apply the above insights to The Daisy Chained
Cards Problem, which is a finitely-chained variant of
an infinitely-chained card problem first described by the
mathematician J. E. Littlewood in 1953, who in turn
credits physicist Erwin Schro¨dinger [2, 5].
4A. Problem Statement
A deck of six playing cards is manufactured with faces
as follows:[
1 2
]
,
[
2 3
]
,
[
3 4
]
,
[
4 5
]
,
[
5 6
]
,
[
6 7
]
A Player examines how the cards are numbered and no-
tices that the cards are linked — daisy chained — by pairs
of numbers. A Dealer shuffles the cards. She then places
them facedown. The Player picks a card and peeks at a
corner. The Player knows he can get 2N units of cash
for the number N he has chosen and that he is entitled
to switch to the other numbered corner. When (if ever)
should he switch if he wants to maximize his return over
time?
B. Analysis
 The Player does not switch on 7 because he knows
it is the maximum.
 He also knows that 6 occurs on two cards, and that
his potential gain of 26+1−26 in switching is greater
than his potential loss of 26 − 26−1, so he switches
on 6.
 Unfortunately there is a downside to switching on
both 6’s: Inevitably he will swap one of these 6’s
for a 5. No matter. By switching on both 5’s he
“gets back” the 6.
 Unfortunately there is a downside to switching on
both 5’s: Inevitably he will swap one of these 5’s
for a 4. No matter. By switching on both 4’s he
“gets back” the 5.
 Unfortunately there is a downside to switching on
both 4’s: Inevitably he will swap one of these 4’s
for a 3. No matter. By switching on both 3’s he
“gets back” the 4.
 Unfortunately there is a downside to switching on
both 3’s: Inevitably he will swap one of these 3’s
for a 2. No matter. By switching on both 2’s he
“gets back” the 3.
 Unfortunately there is a downside to switching on
both 2’s: Inevitably he will swap one of these 2’s for
a 1. No matter. By switching on 1 he “gets back”
the 2.
So he switches for 1 to 6 and holds on 7.
V. A DIALOGUE ON THE ABOVE STRATEGY
It is easiest to pose and resolve the paradoxes asso-
ciated with the above game in the form of a dialogue
between Simplicio, Sagredo, and Salviati, the interlocu-
tors — in increasing order of intelligence — of Galileo’s
Two New Sciences [13]:
Sagredo: I have an issue with the strategy just
described. Let’s assume that the cards are given
letters A to F from the leftmost card to the right-
most. Let’s assume I pick C. I peek at its upper
left corner. No matter what I see I switch to the
lower right corner. If I peek at the lower right
corner first, I switch to the upper left corner. Is
this not true?
Simplicio: I am thinking like you.
Sagredo: So this switching accomplishes nothing.
Not switching on C would leave the results the
same?
Simplicio: Again, I am thinking like you.
Sagredo: And so the solution as it is constructed
is absurd. I am constrained by the strategy to
do something that I need not do. Were I to do
the opposite with C and never switch, the results
would remain the same. And this is true for A,
B, D, and E as well.
Simplicio: I can see no error in your logic,
Sagredo. (he turns to Salviati) Salviati, what do
you make of it?
Salviati: Let me first pose a question. Sagredo,
how would you treat E?
Sagredo: The same as C. I first look at one cor-
ner — No matter what I see, I switch to the other.
Salviati: And how would you treat F?
Sagredo: F is a special case. When I see 7, I must
stay, as 7 is the maximum. On 6 I must switch
in order to maximize my reward . . . it gives me a
shot at getting an extra 7 that I cannot pass up.
Salviati: And how do you know when you are
holding E?
Sagredo: How do I know? From its numbers.
Small numbers tell me that I am dealing with
cards that in reality do not require switching.
When I see 3, I am dealing with B or C. In both
cases I can violate the strategy and not switch
without affecting the result.
Salviati: But when you see 6 might not the card
be E or F?
Sagredo: Yes. So?
Salviati: Well, you’re telling me you can violate
the strategy with impunity and never switch on
E, and yet when you see 6 you have no way of
distinguishing E from F.
5Sagredo: Okay. So you’ve got me! I must switch
when I see 6, so as to get a shot at an extra 7;
and this means that I must sometimes switch on
E. I concede your point. But for A, B, C, and
D I can still violate the strategy and never switch
without affecting the result.
Salviati: And how do you know when you are
holding D?
Salviati: When I see 4 or 5.
Salviati: But when you see 5, might not the card
be E?
Sagredo: So?
Salviati: Well, you’re now trying to convince me
that you can violate the strategy with impunity
and never switch on D. But in practice this re-
quires that you never switch on 5. But when you
have E5, switching on 5 is beneficial, just as when
you have F6 switching on 6 is beneficial.
Sagredo: I concede I want to maximize my 6’s
and 7’s.
Salviati: Then you must always switch on 6 and
5. You switch on 6 to get a shot at an extra 7,
and you switch on 5 to get a shot at an extra 6.
Sagredo: Agreed. You’ve caught me again! I must
always switch on 5 to get a shot at 6, which means
I must sometimes switch on D. I can see where
this is leading. (pauses) I must switch all the way
down to A.
Salviati: Now consider this: If you always switch
on 5 and 6 then you always switch on E. But
always switching on a given card is the very thing
you and Simplicio said was absurd in the first
place.
Sagredo: So I did.
Simplicio: And I.
Salviati: Do you still think it’s absurd?
Sagredo: It still doesn’t seem quite right, but I
can’t put my finger on where I’m going wrong.
Simplicio: I am still inclined to believe that never
switching on A, B, C, D, E is as good a strat-
egy as always switching — and for just the reason
Sagredo gave at the start of today’s discussion:
The results of the game are the same either way,
which is all that matters. This is a settled point
among us, is it not?
Salviati: Not so fast, Simplicio! It’s a confus-
ing aspect of this game that you think you choose
cards and corners but actually you only make de-
cisions about numbers. Neither the cards nor cor-
ners have letters A to F that inspire decisions.
Sagredo: They have no letters, as you say, though
we sometimes talk about “choosing cards” as if we
were picking cards with labeled backs.
Salviati: Well then, let’s for a moment assume
that the backs of the cards were actually labeled
with Sagredo’s letters. Then you could follow a
strategy of never switching on A, B, C, D,
E, while still getting the same reward as always
switching — in this Simplicio is right! But re-
move these letters and you cannot distinguish F6
from E6. And so in trying to convert F6 into
an extra 7 you will unintentionally switch on E6.
Then your only way to restore the status quo ante
is to always switch on the entire group A, B, C,
D, E, which you can only accomplish by switch-
ing on 1 to 6.
Sagredo: Finally I see your point! To always — or
never — switch on A, B, C, D, and E is equally
profitable. But in the absence of letters my at-
tempt to achieve an extra 7 when I switch on 6
leads me to sometimes switch from E6 to E5 —
for a large loss. The only remedy for this is to
always switch on the entire group A, B, C, D,
E. This, as you say, restores the status quo ante.
And if I switch on 1 to 6 then I switch on this
entire group.
Salviati: And you will still convert your 6 to 7.
Your reasoning is the key to understanding The
Player’s strategy.
Simplicio: I still do not understand the mystery
of the cards that are always switched.
Salviati: First imagine that you always switch on
3. Then, to your advantage, you eliminate all 3’s
from the outcome, while adding a 2 and a 4.
Simplicio: Clearly, I benefit by switching on 3.
Salviati: Now imagine that you always switch on
3 and 4. You then add a 2 and a 5, while elimi-
nating a 3 and 4.
Simplicio: I benefit even more by switching on 3
and 4.
Salviati: And the 3 and 4 that remain occur when
the card that luck assigns to you is C and you
perform what amounts to self-canceling swaps.
Simplicio: So that makes always switching on C
just a “side-effect” of always switching on 3 and
4? And I never actually know that I am switching
on C until after the switch is completed?
Salviati: Right. And it follows in turn that always
switching on 3, 4, and 5 leads to always switching
on C and D. The end result is one more 2 and
one more 6 . . .
Sagredo: . . . and one less 3 and one less 5 . . .
6Salviati: . . . where the numbers made more fre-
quent are added at the edges, while the frequency
of 4 does not change.
Sagredo: So always switching on 2 to 6 leads to
always switching on B to E with an end result of
one more 1 and one more 7?
Salviati: Yes, and one less 2 and one less 6.
Simplicio: And if we add “switching on 1” we
then get optimal results?
Salviati: Yes. By always switching on 1 to 6 we
always switch on A to E and on F6. And this
switching on F6 provides a gain of 2
7 − 26 that
we wouldn’t receive by always holding.
Simplicio: Finally I understand!
Sagredo: Perhaps this would be a good place to
stop, as we have come full circle?
Simplicio: But I still don’t understand why, when
I choose a 3 . . .
Salviati: I must stop you, Simplicio! You are go-
ing to tie yourself up in logical knots if you persist
in regarding the random assignments as choices.
The only choice you ever make is whether to
switch. The so-called choice of card or corner is
based on no information at all and is no choice
at all. Treat your initial number as a random
assignment! And be sure to talk of numbers not
cards!
Simplicio: Okay, then . . . Let’s assume I am ran-
domly assigned 3 and I switch and get 4. But if
I had been assigned 4 to begin with, I would au-
tomatically be switching back to 3, which shows
switching to be pointless. (long pause) You’re go-
ing to say that had I been assigned 4 my switching
instead might produce 5. What I formerly took to
be automatic — that I would automatically switch
back to 3 — is obviously not automatic at all. In
switching from 4 I might get 3, but 5 is just as
likely. By speaking in terms of “assigned num-
bers” and ignoring what card I hold, the paradox
concerning “pointless” switching between C3 and
C4 never arises in the first place. After all, I
only learn what card I hold after I switch, so the
card I hold cannot inform any decision I make.
Salviati: As I said earlier, “It’s a confusing as-
pect of this game that you think you choose cards
and corners but actually you only make decisions
about numbers. Neither the cards nor corners
have letters A to F that inspire decisions.” If
you keep this in mind and learn to distinguish an
assignment by fate from a true choice you will
avoid much confusion.
Sagredo: There was a question that I was going
to ask that I am now going to try out in the new
vocabulary. It is this: What happens if the num-
ber of cards Z grows really large to Z > 1 000 000?
Am I not almost always switching? Let’s say luck
assigns me a number L where 1 < L < Z. I
switch and get L ± 1. But had luck given me
L± 1 from the start, switching would give me ei-
ther L− 1± 1 or L+ 1± 1. (pauses) I no longer
see a paradox!
Salviati: It is enough to know that when your
reward is determined by 2N , then N = L ± 1
(if equiprobable) will pay more on average than
N = L, for whatever L luck has assigned to you.
But with Z cards expect to play about Z times
before pulling ahead with this strategy.
Sagredo: I suggest we adjourn for today. My
mind reels with this talk of strategies where cards
are almost always rotated. We have much to
think about.
VI. THE RANDOM WALK PROBLEM
To elaborate upon the point that closed the dialogue,
imagine that you have $X, and you get to receive back
either that amount, or double-or-half that, or double-or-
half that again, and so on, optionally, until you decide to
quit. How would you decide when to stop invoking the
double-or-half option?
As it turns out, you should just keep on switching until
your random walk produces your desired reward.
Now consider that the Random Walk Problem differs
from The Daisy Chained Cards Problem in that the first
lets you “go double-or-half” as many times as you want,
whereas the second lets you go double-or-half at most
once. What the two games have in common, however, is
that for both:
 The likelihood of coming out ahead for each single
act of switching is an even bet.
 If your number is not maximal you always switch in
order to introduce variability into that number —
irrespective of what that number happens to be at
the time.
The more variability you can introduce, the greater your
average reward. As it is, wholesale switching is forbidden
in The Daisy Chained Cards Problem, but by switching
whenever your number is less than the maximum you
can still “do retail” what The Random Walk Problem
lets you “do wholesale.”
7VII. STANDARDIZING SWITCHING
PROBLEMS
A. Vocabulary of The Daisy Chained Cards
Problem
It is instructive to consider the three so-called
“choices” The Player makes in The Daisy Chained Cards
Problem:
 When he “chooses” a card he uses no information
and acquires no information.
 When he “chooses” a corner he uses no information
and acquires some information.
 When he “chooses” whether to switch he uses some
information to decide whether to acquire other in-
formation.
All three of these diverse acts can be thought of as
“choices,” but doing so invites insidious confusion for the
reasons outlined above. The first and second non-choices
are just so much hocus-pocus. They are equivalent to a
magician misdirecting the focus of his audience by call-
ing attention to something of no importance (the Player
chooses a card and peeks at a corner), while the matter of
central importance but possessing less theatrics (a num-
ber is randomly assigned) is missed. If the reader limits
the use of the word “choice” to the act of using some in-
formation to decide whether to acquire other information
he is proof against such misdirection and avoids much of
this confusion.
B. A Standardized Form for Switching Problems
To better understand switching problems the author
recommends they be restated in this standard form (if
possible):
 Before play, The Player examines the distribution
of numbers and builds a switching table of possi-
ble switches (or, alternately, is simply shown the
switching table). For The Daisy Chained Cards
Problem this switching table is:
1←→ 2
2←→ 3
3←→ 4
4←→ 5
5←→ 6
6←→ 7
 Luck randomly assigns a number N from this ta-
ble to The Player, where those numbers that ap-
pear more often are proportionately more likely to
be assigned. (Above, the numbers 2 to 6 are each
twice as likely as either 1 or 7.) Such an assignment
produces a reduced switching table in which the as-
signed number is underlined. Here, 3 is assigned:
2←→ 3
3←→ 4
 The Player chooses whether to switch based on the
possibilities listed in the reduced switching table.
(Above, The Player is assigned 3 and knows he can
switch to either 2 or 4, which are equiprobable.)
The above standardization prevents much of the confu-
sion that tends to infect the discussion. There are no ex-
traneous cards chosen or corners lifted in the final analy-
sis; instead only essential information is abstracted. This
accomplishes much the same thing that a Free Body Di-
agram does in physics:
In such a diagram the extraneous environment is omitted
and we are left with only a free body and the forces acting
on it.
C. Reframing The Daisy Chained Cards Problem
The Daisy Chained Cards Problem can be put in this
standardized form.
A Player is shown this switching table:
1←→ 2
2←→ 3
3←→ 4
4←→ 5
5←→ 6
6←→ 7
Luck randomly assigns him a number N from the table.
He knows he can get 2N units of cash for the number N
and that he is entitled to switch. When (if ever) should
he switch if he wants to maximize his return over time?
The Player should switch on 1 to 6 and hold on 7.
8D. The Figure/Ground Illusion and The Daisy
Chained Cards Problem
With regard to the figure/ground illusion, when The
Player sees a 1 he knows the other number is a 2 — so
both 1 and 2 are figure. When The Player sees a 7 he
knows the other number is a 6 — so both 6 and 7 are
likewise figure. But when The Player sees a 2 to 6, the
number he sees is always figure and the numbers he might
switch to are always ground. That the numbers 2 to 6
can sometimes appear as figure and sometimes ground
cannot help but cause confusion of the type illustrated
by the dialogue. But this is the inevitable consequence
of the cards being daisy chained.
E. Reframing The Random Walk Problem
The Random Walk Problem can be put in standard-
ized form.
A Player is shown this infinitely large switching table:
...
−3←→ −2
−2←→ −1
−1←→ −0
+0←→ +1
+1←→ +2
+2←→ +3
...
He is assigned the number N = 0. He knows he can get
2N units of cash for the number N , but he is entitled to
evaluate N and optionally switch, iteratively, until he
is satisfied with the amount he can get. What strategy
should he follow?
The Player should just keep switching until a random
walk takes him to the reward of 2N units that he desires.
F. How Should You Think of the Card You Are
Holding?
It is instructive to consider what it means to “hold a
card.” Consider this passage, written by mathematician
Robert A. Rosenbaum [14]. It concerns not numbered
playing cards, but baseball umpire Bill “The Old Arbi-
trator” Klem [15] calling balls and strikes:
Three umpires were discussing their own atti-
tudes and virtues. The first umpire remarked,
“Some is balls and some is strikes, and I calls
’em as I see ’em.” The second, a bit more self-
assured, said, “Some is balls and some is strikes,
and I calls ’em as they are.” Then up spoke Bill
Klem, the dean of them all: “Some is balls and
some is strikes, but ’til I calls ’em, they ain’t
nothing.” The first of these umpires, wrestling
with reality to the extent of his own poor ability,
is clearly an engineer type. The second, describ-
ing the universe in sure, bold strokes, is a close
relative of a happy physicist — of the nineteenth
century. But Klem takes his place with the other
mathematical immortals — Bolyai, Lobachevsky,
Riemann — who have invented their own worlds.
Perhaps the best thing you can do when you hold an
unidentified card from a deck is imagine it as “one of the
deck,” or, if you know one corner, as “one of several.”
Perhaps the worst thing you can do is treat the uniden-
tified card you hold as a single card whose identity you
happen not to know. The snare of regarding a selected
but-unlooked-at card as somehow special is the subject of
the next section.
VIII. THE MARKED CARDS PROBLEM
We will now consider The Marked Cards Problem.
A. Problem Statement
A marked deck of six playing cards is manufactured
with faces as follows:[
1 2
]
,
[
2 3
]
,
[
3 4
]
,
[
4 5
]
,
[
5 6
]
,
[
6 7
]
A Player examines how the cards are numbered. A Dealer
shuffles the cards. She then places them facedown. The
Player picks one card and secretly peeks at one numbered
corner and sees a 3. He knows he can get 2N units of
cash for the number N he has chosen and that he is en-
titled to switch to the other numbered corner. Because
the deck is marked The Dealer is able to see that the card
chosen has a 3 and 4, but she does not know the number
secretly chosen. Should The Player switch? What does
The Dealer think The Player should do?
B. Analysis
The Player knows only the number chosen. He has
narrowed down the card chosen to either of two.
The Dealer knows only the card chosen. She has nar-
rowed down the number chosen to either of two.
For The Player the reduced switching table is:
2←→ 3
3←→ 4
and it makes sense to switch away from 3 (underlined)
given the reward of 2N .
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3←→ 4
and she can see no advantage in The Player switching,
because he has as much to lose as gain, the difference: 24−
23. Note that she does not know The Player’s number,
which is why no number is underlined.
Now assume The Player writes his chosen number on a
chit of paper and hands it facedown to The Dealer. If she
were to conclude that The Player’s choice has changed
into a single number, which she happens not to know,
but which is on the chit she now holds, she would be
making the same error as The Player who, upon choosing
a card and peeking at its corner, imagines it represents a
single switching table row that he happens not to know.
It may be harder to see the absurdity of The Player’s
reasoning than The Dealer’s, in part because the card he
holds has two numbers. Nevertheless, The Player has no
more right to think that what he holds represents a single
table row, than The Dealer has to think that what she
holds represents a single number. For Player and Dealer
the card and number are, respectively, “one of two” until
they are revealed.
The Player may be tempted to suppose:
I know the number under one of this card’s cor-
ners. Had I initially chosen this card’s other cor-
ner, then automatically switching would merely
take me be back to what I have now . . . which
would be pointless.
But The Player who thinks this way is acting like he
knows what “this card” is, which only The Dealer knows.
Having made this mistake, The Player reaches the same
conclusion as The Dealer — there is as much to lose as
gain — but without The Dealer’s justification.
Is The Player’s reasoning totally wrong? Actually,
no — it is insidiously wrong, which is far worse. By
falsely imagining that he has pinned down the card he
holds to just one, and therefore that he has only one cor-
ner/number to switch to, The Player is already seriously
prejudiced against the benefits of switching, without even
knowing the origin of his prejudice.
IX. THE TWIN’S SWITCHING PROBLEM
We will now consider The Twin’s Switching Problem.
A. Problem Statement
A deck of six playing cards is manufactured with faces
as follows:[
1 2
]
,
[
2 3
]
,
[
3 4
]
,
[
4 5
]
,
[
5 6
]
,
[
6 7
]
Twins, Viola and Sebastian, examine how the cards are
numbered. A Dealer shuffles the cards and then places
them facedown. Viola and Sebastian together settle on a
single card. Viola peeks at one corner and Sebastian the
other. Each can get 2N units of cash for the number N
they now have, but they are each independently entitled
to switch to the card’s other number, and there is no rule
against them winding up with the same number. After
peeking they may not communicate until after they have
both decided what to do. So each must make their deci-
sion without knowing the other’s number, or even whether
the other has decided to switch. To maximize their joint
return over time what strategy should they follow?
B. Paradox
The situation is symmetric. Sebastian reasons:
Let’s assume we both follow the usual strategy and
switch on 1 to 6 and hold on 7. Then, for 1 to
6 any gain I get by switching is Viola’s loss, and
vice versa. So the usual strategy is pointless.
Is he right?
C. Analysis
No. Sebastian’s claim that with the usual strategy
“any gain I get by switching is Viola’s loss” is obviously
false when he has a 6 and Viola has a 7; then Sebastian
gains when he switches from 6 to a 7, while Viola, holding
with 7, does not lose. Moreover, by always switching on
1 to 6 they can gain this 7 with no offsetting loss, a point
touched on in the dialogue:
Sagredo: Finally I see your point! To always — or
never — switch on A, B, C, D, and E is equally
profitable. But in the absence of letters my at-
tempt to achieve an extra 7 when I switch on 6
leads me to sometimes switch from E6 to E5 —
for a large loss. The only remedy for this is to
always switch on the entire group A, B, C, D,
E. This, as you say, restores the status quo ante.
And, if I switch on 1 to 6, then I switch on this
entire group.
In settling on the above strategy Viola may reason as
follows:
When I get a 5, I know that you, Sebastian, could
have a 6. In trying to convert such a 6 into a 7
you would wind up with a 5, like me. Disaster!
We both need to switch on 1 to 6 every time. This
will allow us to convert our 6’s into 7’s, while
preventing all such disasters at the smallest cost.
In summary, following the usual strategy allows Viola
and Sebastian to each convert a 6 to a 7 at no cost com-
pared against the do-nothing-strategy. Of course, the
do-nothing-strategy misses the opportunity to convert a
1 into a 2 at no risk. So, in the final accounting, the usual
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strategy allows Viola and Sebastian to each convert a 6
to a 7 at a cost of each converting a 2 to a 1. It involves
a lot of switching, but it is the optimal plan.
It is instructive to consider what happens as the num-
ber of cards K grows ever larger. Then the situations
in which Viola’s strategy improves upon the above do-
almost-nothing-strategy of “holding except on 1” are in-
creasingly rare. Moreover, their persistent switching
will — at least to some onlookers — appear to be ever
more pointless: You can imagine the twins almost always
rotating their jointly chosen card 180◦.
On the surface the twin’s strategy could not be more
different from the do-almost-nothing-strategy, given that
their strategy involves almost always switching, whereas
the do-almost-nothing-strategy involves almost never
switching. But it is Viola and Sebastian’s fate to have
their fortunes yoked in such a way that these strategies
produce only two situations that are economically differ-
ent. If there are K cards these two situations allow the
twins to gain 2K+1−2K at a cost of 22−21. As K grows
larger these two situations will become increasingly rare,
and it may take Viola and Sebastian K or more plays be-
fore they find themselves pulling ahead of the benchmark
do-almost-nothing-strategy.
D. What Should the Twins Do If They Do Not
Know the Number of Cards?
It is convenient at this point to touch on the issue of
what the twins should do if they know that the switching
table takes the form:
1←→ 2
2←→ 3
3←→ 4
...
where they do not know the number of rows/cards. A
plausible strategy is for them to both switch on numbers
that are less than “the largest seen so far,” a strategy
that would likely converge on the usual strategy within
K hands if there are K cards.
That said, if the numbers in their switching table each
occurred only once, and were instead interleaved, as here:
1←→ 2
3←→ 4
5←→ 6
...
this would change everything. This is the subject of the
next section.
X. THE INTERLEAVED CARDS PROBLEM
We will now consider The Interleaved Cards Problem.
A. Problem Statement
A deck of six playing cards is manufactured with faces
as follows:[
1 2
]
,
[
3 4
]
,
[
5 6
]
,
[
7 8
]
,
[
9 10
]
,
[
11 12
]
A Player examines how the cards are numbered and no-
tices that the cards are now not daisy chained by pairs of
numbers — instead they are interleaved. One of the twelve
numbers N is randomly assigned to him. He knows he
can get 2N units of cash for the number N and that he is
entitled to switch to a different number on the same card.
When (if ever) should he switch if he wants to maximize
his return over time?
B. Reframing The Interleaved Cards Problem
The Interleaved Cards Problem can be put in stan-
dardized form.
A Player is shown this switching table:
1←→ 2
3←→ 4
5←→ 6
7←→ 8
9←→ 10
11←→ 12
Luck randomly assigns him a number N from the table.
He knows he can get 2N units of cash for the number N
and that he is entitled to switch. When (if ever) should
he switch if he wants to maximize his return over time?
As with The Daisy Chained Cards Problem, The
Player is given a chance to double or halve his reward,
but now the numbers are no longer daisy chained. In-
stead, every number occurs just once, a key difference
that makes it pointless to always switch.
But, in actual fact, The Player knows all he needs to
know to make perfect choices every time, should he de-
sire. In the absence of daisy chaining all he needs to do
is identify the one row singled out by his number, and
switch if his alternative number is higher than what he
already has. This is a result of how the numbers in the
switching table are “married” to each other. In the lan-
guage of figure and ground this makes all twelve numbers
figure.
Two observations:
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 Always switching on any odd number to any greater
even number is pointless.
 Always switching on any even number to any
greater odd number is beneficial.
C. Daisy Chaining and The Two Envelope Problem
It appears to the author that The Two Envelope Prob-
lem with an assumption of at least some daisy chaining
is closer to what people experience when they make deci-
sions in everyday life, than is The Two Envelope Problem
with universal interleaving, which appears to be more a
product of purely mathematical thinking. Why should
two dollars be paired with four dollars, but never with
one dollar? Life is not like that. Be that as it may, we
will now consider a problem where, depending on whose
point of view is adopted, there either is — or is not —
daisy chaining.
XI. THE TWO ENVELOPE PROBLEM OF
RAYMOND SMULLYAN
With regard to The Two Envelope Problem, logician
Raymond Smullyan observed [6]:
I suspect that probability is not the heart of the
matter, and I have thought of a new version of
the paradox which doesn’t involve probability at
all.
A. Smullyan’s Two Contradictory Propositions
He goes on to reduce the paradox to “two contradictory
propositions”:
Proposition 1. The amount that you will gain, if
you do gain, is greater than the amount you will
lose, if you do lose.
Proposition 2. The amounts are the same.
He then “proves” each in turn. The reader is asked:
Which of the two propositions is the correct one?
They obviously can’t both be right!
B. Reframing Smullyan’s Propositions
Smullyan’s Propositions admit of more than one spe-
cific interpretation. For the sake of argument we will as-
sume that Smullyan’s Two Propositions can be reframed
as:
2←→ 3
3←→ 4
and
3←→ 4
with a reward of 2N for Bob and Alice who have, respec-
tively, the above switching tables. It follows that:
 Bob is assigned a 3. He has more to gain 24 − 23
than lose 23 − 22 by switching.
 Alice has as much to lose as gain by switching: the
difference 24 − 23. She has not been assigned a
number.
C. Analysis
The reader will recognize that this is no more than The
Marked Cards Problem, discussed in Sec. VIII, with:
 Bob in the role of Player.
 Alice in the role of Dealer.
 Bob deciding whether to switch from 3.
 Alice sharing Bob’s reward.
Note that, originally, Alice sharing Bob’s reward was not
part of The Marked Cards Problem. It is added now to
complete the problem.
D. The Dealer/Player Illusion
In the language of the figure/ground illusion:
 When we see things from Bob’s perspective we see
3 as figure, and 2 and 4 as ground.
 When we see things from Alice’s perspective we see
3 and 4 as ground.
In this way Smullyan’s Propositions 1 and 2 are both
accurate descriptions of The Marked Cards Problem, but
from Bob’s and Alice’s points of view, respectively :
 From Bob’s point of view he actually does have
something to gain on average by his switching.
 From Alice’s point of view she actually does have
nothing to gain on average by Bob’s switching.
And their respective switching tables are actually accu-
rate representations of their situations for each of them.
It follows that for the omniscient reader who can see
this situation either way, but who cannot adopt both
perspectives simultaneously, the above Dealer/Player Il-
lusion might paradoxically oscillate in the mind in much
the same way this figure/ground illusion oscillates:
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E. Summary
Smullyan’s version of the Two Envelope Paradox is es-
pecially instructive because it directs attention toward
the difference between Bob’s and Alice’s points of view.
Smullyan’s discounting the importance of probability is
also insightful, as paradoxical aspects of the problem oc-
cur even when probabilities are deliberately minimized
(as in The Two Commuters Problem). The author found
Raymond Smullyan’s version of The Two Envelope Para-
dox an excellent starting point for researching this arti-
cle, therefore it is especially satisfying that it provides an
excellent stopping point as well.
XII. CONCLUSION
This article will conclude by considering a few practi-
calities that have somehow not made it into the previous
discussions.
A. The Two Envelope Problem Reconsidered
It is a simple matter to translate The Marked Cards
Problem into a version of The Two Envelope Problem. A
presenter simply picks a card, fills two envelopes accord-
ing to the two numbers on the card, and then places these
before The Player. However, the original Two Envelope
Problem differs from The Marked Cards Problem in that
no switching table is available. Are rewards/numbers
daisy chained as they are in The Marked Cards Prob-
lem? Or interleaved as in The Interleaved Cards Prob-
lem? We do not know. Do the rewards/numbers have
an upper or lower bound? Again we do not know. And,
as The Marked Cards Problem shows, there are ample
sources of confusion even when we have answers to these
questions. Lacking answers, we face ambiguities that are
impossible to resolve.
B. The Two Envelopes in Real Life
And what about switching envelopes in real life? If
someone actually presents you with two envelopes, what
should you do in the absence of a switching table? In
this case you must consider how many times the offer
will be repeated, your needs, and you must infer what
you can about the switching table from the presenter of
the envelopes. You also must keep in mind that large
rewards are proportionately less likely.
So assume that you are given a one-time choice be-
tween two envelopes where one contains twice the other.
You open one envelope and see so much money. Perhaps,
given your limited needs, you should keep that amount?
Or, perhaps, this amount is of little use to you just now,
but twice that would satisfy your needs, and so you de-
cide to gamble? Or, perhaps, from the limited means, or
stinginess, of the presenter you know that the other en-
velope is unlikely to contain twice the amount you now
hold? All of these questions can arise in making your
decision.
C. The Probability Teacher Versus the Billionaire
Now imagine another one-time offer. You are shown
two envelopes and are told that one contains one dollar,
and the other either one million dollars or a tiny speck of
copper worth 1/10 000. You are also told that you will
only get to see the contents of the unchosen envelope if
you actually switch. Luck assigns you the envelope with
the dollar, so you have this reduced switching table:
1/10 000⇐⇒ $1
$1⇐⇒ $1 000 000
with the double arrows signifying that in this case
the rows are not necessarily equiprobable. Should you
switch? If the person filling the envelopes is the teacher
of your probability course I would suggest you pocket
the dollar (unless you want that speck of copper). But
what if the person behind the offer is an elderly billion-
aire with a mischievous grin? If only for your peace of
mind I would suggest you open the other envelope. And
who knows?
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